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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRANSFER FOR IMPROPER
VENUE BY COURT OF APPEALS BASED ON INHERENT
POWER
ALTHOUGH the jurisdiction and power of lower federal courts has
been rested solely upon statutory authority,1 in the interests of
justice and effective judicial administration, federal courts have at
times exercised inherent powers outside statutory bounds.2 This
power has been invoked to transfer proceedings between courts of
appeals in cases where the transferee court had exclusive jurisdic-
tion.3 In Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC,4 the Tenth Circuit
expanded the concept of inherent power to allow transfer for im-
proper venue.
Panhandle filed a petition for review of a Federal Power Com-
mission order pursuant to section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act.5
This act, which vests jurisdiction in any circuit for direct review,
also provides the aggrieved party with three choices of venue: the
circuit where he is located; the circuit where he has his principal
place of business; or the District of Columbia Circuit.0 Panhandle,
'E.g., Concord Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 69 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1934);
United Mine Workers v. Chafin, 286 Fed. 959, 962 (S.D. W. Va. 1923); cf. United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812).
2 See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1939) (inherent power to stay
disposition of funds); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920) (inherent power
to appoint persons to aid judge); Griffin v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257
(1844) (inherent power to supervise conduct of officers of the court); Ex parte United
States, 101 F.2d 870, 875-78 (7th Cir. 1939), af'd mem. by an equally divided Court
sub nom. United States v. Stone, 808 U.S. 519 (1939) (inherent power to determine
sufficiency of evidence); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1906) (inherent
power to stay proceedings) (dictum).
3See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 272 F.2d 510, 511 (D.C. Cir.), transferred from
253 F.2d 536, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1958); Central W. Util. Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 306, 308
(3d Cir. 1957); L. J. Marquis & Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.), transferred from
134 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1943); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385, 391
(1945) (dictum); Far East Conference v. Maritime Comm'n, 337 F.2d 146, 148 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (dictum).
337 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1965). While the
Eighth Circuit's decision is chronologically the final determination of the subject
matter of this casenote, the opinion quotes extensively from the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision and summarily discusses the exhaustive treatment of the subject by that court.
Thus, this note considers the Tenth Circuit opinion as the principal case and sub-
sequent citations will be to that opinion only.
652 Stat. 831 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717r (b) (1964).
61bid. Review provisions of this nature are common in the administrative field.
See, e.g., Federal Power Act § 313 (b), 49 Stat. 860 (1935), as amended, 16 U.S.C.
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a corporation with its principal place of business in the Eighth
Circuit, filed in the Tenth Circuit in reliance on that court's inter-
pretation of the phrase "is located."'' The Supreme Court subse-
quently overruled this interpretation,8 rendering venue improper
in the Tenth Circuit, and Panhandle moved to transfer the proceed-
ing to the Eighth Circuit.9 The sixty-day period for filing had
lapsed,10 hence Panhandle would have been without a means of
review in the absence of transfer.": The Tenth Circuit transferred
to the Eighth Circuit as a function of its inherent power' 2 on the
ground that it was in the interest of justice and based on sound prin-
ciples of judicial administration.
Traditionally, the federal district courts have considered them-
selves without power to transfer for improper venue unless such
power is provided by statute.13 Therefore, a timely objection based
on improper venue led to mandatory dismissal14 until Congress
adopted section 1406 to permit transfer for improper venue between
district courts.' 5 The transfer provisions for courts of appeals do not
§ 8251 (b) (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act § 24 (a), 49 Stat. 834 (1935),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 79x (a) (1964).
7In Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 337 U.S. 33 (1964),
the Tenth Circuit had held that "is located" referred to that circuit in which the sub-
stantial activities of the natural gas company, to which the FPC order related, were
conducted. 317 F.2d at 820. Panhandle's reliance on Texaco was vindicated by
the Tenth Circuit's denial of the initial motion to dismiss for improper venue. 837
F.2d at 250.
8 In FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 37-39 (1964), the Supreme Court held that
"is located" referred to the state of incorporation only.
0 Motion of Petitioner for Transfer of Proceedings, April 23, 1964, :p. 1. Under
§ 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 831 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717r (b)
(1964), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., supra note 8,
venue was proper in the Eighth Circuit (Panhandle's principal place of business), the
Third Circuit (Panhandle's state of incorporation being Delaware), or the District of
Columbia Circuit. See Motion of Respondent to Dismiss, Feb. 4, 1964, p. 2.
10 Section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 831 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717r (b) (1964), requires that the review petition be filed within sixty days of the ad-
ministrative denial of rehearing. Though Panhandle had fied well within this period,
the Supreme Court decision in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., supra note 8, was handed down
after the sixty-day period for filing had lapsed.
"'See Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 167 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1948); cf. Blume &
George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 Mici. L. REv. 937, 960 (1951).
12 337 F.2d at 251.
"I See, e.g., United States v. 74 Cases, 55 F. Supp. 745, 747 (W.D.S.C. 1944).
'"See Ibid.; Billings Utility Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 40 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mont.
1941); cf. Brown v. Heinen, 61 F. Supp. 563 (D. Minn. 1945).
1,,The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer




contain a corresponding provision. Express statutory authority for
transfer from a court of appeals is found only in two statutes,10
neither of which relates to venue problems.
Whether courts of appeals have inherent power to transfer for
improper venue has been expressly considered in only one case
besides Panhandle, in which the Fifth Circuit in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
FPC reached a contrary result. 7 The Fifth Circuit based its refusal
to allow transfer on the lack of case authority providing for transfer
for improper venue pursuant to inherent power, and Congress'
failure to include a specific provision for courts of appeals in section
1406.10
Panhandle's rejection of these arguments 9 would appear to be
sound for several reasons. Authority for the concept of inherent
power exists in a series of federal cases allowing both transfer 20
: 28 U.S.C. §2112(a) (1964) provides that if review petitions are filed in two or
more circuits, and the agency has filed the record in one circuit, thereby giving it
exclusive jurisdiction, the other circuit (s) may transfer to that circuit. This part of
the statute reflects a codification of certain cases in which inherent power had been
invoked to authorize transfer. E.g., L. J. Marquis & Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 822 (3d Cir.),
transferred from 134 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1943). Thereafter, the transferee circuit may
in turn transfer the proceedings for the convenience of the parties or in the interest
of justice to any other court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (a) (1964). This amendment
was necessitated by the fact that, since all review statutes provide for exclusive juris-
diction in the circuit wherein the agency filed the record, the agency was in effect
determining which court shall have jurisdiction. S. Riap. No. 2129, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1958).
The second statute, 64 Stat. 1130 (1950), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1037(b) (1964)
provides for transfer of a review petition to a district court for determination of find-
ings of fact if no administrative hearing was required and a material issue of fact
is presented on review.
7 330 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964).
18Id. at 825.
19 337 F.2d at 252. The Government also made another contention which was not
discussed by the court. Knowing that Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.
1963), rev'd, 337 U.S. 333 (1964), was being appealed, see notes 7-8 supra, the Govern-
ment argued that Panhandle should have foreseen reversal on the venue question
and protected itself by filing in another proper circuit, Respondent's Opposition to
Transfer and Motion to Dismiss, May 27, 1964, pp. 8-9. But, as the Government
itself conceded: "It is possible, however, that the Supreme Court may not reach the
venue issue, because the merits of the case are also presented in Superior Oil Corp.
v. FPC . . . . There is no venue question in that case." Motion of Respondent to
Dismiss, Feb. 4, 1964, p. 1.
20See cases cited note 3 supra. In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 272 F.2d 510
(D.C. Cir. 1958), the transferee circuit court retained jurisdiction of a case even
though it recognized that transfer was predicated upon an erroneous construction
of a jurisdictional statute. Id. at 511. The decision can be explained only on the
basis of inherent power because a transferee court of appeals has the power to review
the propriety of transfer. See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1965: 822
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and other appropriate acts.21  The criteria to be drawn from these
cases is that inherent power may be used to facilitate the orderly
and expeditious disposition of actions22 or for equitable relief.23
Though the Tenth Circuit refers solely to the first criterion, 24 it
seems that Panhandle may be properly classified a judicial transfer
to avoid the inequity of dismissal.25
Secondly, although Congress in 1948 was aware of the problem
of transfer for improper venue in district courts when it adopted
section 1406, the similar problem in courts of appeals was not pre-
sented until 1964 in Panhandle and the Fifth Circuit decision.
In the absence of legislation, the policy of section 140626 would
appear to apply to courts of appeals cases as well as to district court
cases.27 The Tenth Circuit did not indiscriminately apply the
inherent power principle, but brought it within, and limited it to,
the "interest of justice" philosophy of section 1406 (a).28  Under sec-
tion 1406 (a), "interest of justice" has been interpreted to limit
transfer to those situations where the petitions are filed in good
faith and dismissal would be inequitable.29 In Panhandle, the
petitioner had acted in good faith by relying on the Tenth Circuit's
previous interpretation of the venue provision, and dismissal would
preclude a hearing on the merits because the sixty-day period for
filing petitions had lapsed. Thus, one apparent distinction between
the Fifth Circuit case of Gulf Oil and Panhandle was that Panhandle
filed in the Tenth Circuit in reliance on that court's interpretation,
21 See cases cited note 2 supra.
12 E.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920) (inherent power to appoint
persons to aid judge); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1906) (inherent
power to stay proceedings) (dictum).
23 E.g., United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 190-91, 197-98 (1939) (inherent power
to stay disposition of funds).
28337 F.2d at 252.
2r See text following note 29 infra.
20 Under § 1406 (a) a district court may transfer for improper venue if the trans-
feror court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. United
Air Lines, 190 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1951), revld on other grounds, 342 U.S. 396
(1952); the transferee forum is a forum where venue is proper, e.g., Blackman v.
Guerre, 190 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1951), aft'd, 342 U.S. 512 (1952); the interests of
justice will be served thereby, e.g., Clark Transp. Co. v. ICC, 228 F. Supp. 236 (D.
Minn. 1963); Gold v. Griffith, 190 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
27 As is the case under § 1406 (a), transfer by the court of appeals in Panhandle is
a transfer by the first court of Article III jurisdiction to entertain the case.
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (1964).
20 Clark Transp. Co. v. ICC, 228 F. Supp. 236 (D. Minn. 1968); Gold v. Griffith, 190
F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
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whereas in Gulf Oil the Fifth Circuit had not yet construed the
venue provision.
Thirdly, although inherent power to transfer for equitable and
convenience purposes was first employed in 1943, 80 Congress did not
codify transfer under these particular circumstances in the 1948
Judicial Code, but waited until 1958.31 Thus, transfer pursuant to
inherent power was employed for fifteen years without legislative
disapproval, and ultimate legislative codification tends to imply
that this residual power has been used properly.3 2
The use of the inherent power principle, however, should be
limited in scope. All administrative review statutes provide several
circuits where venue is clearly proper.38 Where a petitioner files
in a circuit where venue is not clearly proper, his choice may have
been motivated by one of several reasons, such as convenience. The
choice may be predicated upon a calculated judgment that the
questionable circuit will be more favorable to him in resolving
questions of substantive law. Mere forum-shopping34 should not
be sufficient for a court to invoke its inherent power to transfer for
improper venue. Thus, when the case of first impression upon
which Panhandle had relied for venue35 was appealed to the Supreme
30 See L. J. Marquis & Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1943).
8128 U.S.C. § 2112 (a) (1964); see note 16 supra.
82 The power to stay proceedings and transfer in certain non-venue situations has
been codified. See 28 U.S.C. § 2551 (1964) (power to order stay) and 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (a)
(1964) (power to transfer). The latter is discussed in note 16 supra. However, other
uses of inherent power, such as inherent power to stay disposition of funds and
inherent power to appoint persons to aid the judge, remain uncodified. It is possible,
of course, that either could be construed as a function of the courts' power to make
rules under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1964).
8Most of the statutes are listed in 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAMCrC 0.144[17], at
1679-86 (2d ed. 1964), and in the Reviser's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964).
3, The Government contended that Panhandle's presence in the Tenth Circuit was
the result of forum-shopping. Motion of Respondent to Dismiss (Eighth Circuit),
p. 14. Panhandle denied this contention. Answer to Motion to Dismiss (Eighth
Circuit), Dec. 1, 1964, pp. 3-4. It cannot, however, be shown that a decision on sub-
stantive law would be more favorable in the Tenth Circuit since there has been no
interpretation of the substantive law in question, the Helium Act Amendment, 74 Stat.
922 (1960), 50 U.S.C. § 167 (1964).
The forum-shopping problem would, however, exist in many other cases appealed
pursuant to administrative review statutes with unclear venue provisions, See, e.g.,
Commodity Exchange Act §6(b), 42 Stat. 1001 (1922), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §9
(1964); Federal Trade Act § 45 (c), 28 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c)
(1964); Federal Power Act § 313 (b), 49 Stat. 860 (1935), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (b)
(1964).




Court,38 the Court denied motions to transfer,3 7 and remanded to
the Tenth Circuit with directions to dismiss.38 Although that case
was distinguishable from Panhandle on other grounds,39 a critical
difference would appear to be Panhandle's good faith reliance on
the Tenth Circuit's previous determination that venue was proper.40
Another limitation upon inherent power to transfer is the power of
the transferee court to review the propriety of transfer.41
Limited to the existing fact situation, Panhandle reflects a
justifiable use of inherent power. Transfer for improper venue
based on inherent power should only be used as a last alternative
where there has been a good faith filing and dismissal would operate
as a bar to a hearing on the merits.42 Otherwise, transfer in courts
of appeals should be left to Congress, and legislation might be
enacted similar to that available in section 1406 (a) in district
courts.43  As an alternative, Congress might provide that where a
petition has been filed in good faith in a forum of improper venue,
the limitation period for the filing shall be revived. In any event,
Panhandle's treatment of inherent power should not be made the
basis for unlimited expansion of the principle.
"0 See note 8 supra.
37 The petitioner in Texaco moved to remand to the Third Circuit, or to remand
to the Tenth Circuit with orders to transfer to the Third Circuit. The Supreme Court
denied both motions. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 974 (1964).
"' Upon remand to the Tenth Circuit, the court of appeals stated that "we would
grant transfer in this case if it were not for the direction of the Supreme Court [to
dismiss]." Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 337 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1964).
11 Texaco had reached the Supreme Court with a companion case, Superior Oil
Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), due to a conflict between the two circuits
on matters of substantive law. After disposing of the preliminary issue of venue in
Texaco, the Court upheld the substantive law interpretation advanced in Superior.
Thus, dismissal in Texaco was distinguishable from transfer in Panhandle on the
ground that the former case had already been decided on its merits by the Supreme
Court.
"0 This is also a basis for distinguishing Panhandle from the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Gulf Oil. See text following note 29 supra.
"I See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962); Wilson v. Kansas City So. Ry., 101 F. Supp. 56, 60-61
(W.D. Mo.. 1951). However, the decision of the transferor court should not be set
aside unless there is apparent abuse of discretion. Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537
(6th Cir. 1951).
2As additional justification, there appears to be some basis for the view that
limited federal jurisdiction and power is the result of the federal-state conflict. See
WPJGHT, FEDERAL CounRs § 1, at 2 (1963). In the situation of direct review of federal
administrative orders in federal courts, that conflict is not present since there is no
encroachment on state power.
,"'Even though a statutory remedy similar to § 1406 (a) may seem appropriate, it
may be easier to clarify the small number of unclear venue provisions in administra-
tive review statutes. See note 34 supra.
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